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Freedom of Contract and Freedom of Person:
A Brief History of “Involuntary Servitude”
in American Fundamental Law
 . 

Liberal ideas are normally taken to have played an important role in the
development of free markets, and of free labor based on contract in those
markets.A closer look at labor regimes in the nineteenth century, however,
reveals that liberal commitments to freedom did not straightforwardly
produce what we today would think of as free labor. Just as often they
produced a form of coerced contractual labor. And this was quite simply
because liberal commitments to freedom embraced a basic conﬂict between
freedom of contract and freedom of person.
To the extent that one possessed absolute freedom of contract,
one would have been free to contract away one’s personal liberty. One
would have been free to contract into slavery or bind one’s labor irrevocably for long periods of time. To the extent that the state found it desirable to prevent this result, it could only do so by imposing limitations
on the freedom of contract in the interest of preserving the freedom of
persons.
Modern free labor is the result of just such a choice to restrict
freedom of contract. Before this basic issue within liberalism was ﬁnally
resolved in favor of freedom of person and against freedom of contract,
many of the ﬁrst market regimes based on free contract produced coerced
contractual labor rather than free labor. In the ﬁrst ﬂourishing of
free contract in the nineteenth century, lawmakers in many different
countries seem to have believed that labor markets based on promises
could only function properly if contracts could be rigorously enforced
against workers. As a result they often gave employers harsh remedies for
contract breach so that they could compel workers to perform their
agreements.
281
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In effect, these contract regimes allowed workers to bind their labor
irrevocably for a time.They represented the expression of a kind of freedom
of contract, the freedom to contract away part of one’s freedom for a time.
Only when this contractual freedom was limited by circumscribing the
kinds of contract remedies employers enjoyed at law, or were permitted
to induce workers to agree to in labor contracts, was modern free labor
created. Modern free labor was not the product of liberal ideas as they were
manifested in free markets but the product of a difﬁcult political and moral
resolution of fundamental dilemmas within liberalism itself.
Freedom of trade (Gewerbefreiheit) was introduced into Prussia by the
Industrial Law (Gewerbeordnung) of 1845.1 As part of this liberal, free-market
reform, the relationships between masters and their journeymen in the
artisanal sector, and factory workers and their employers in the expanding industrial sector, were made a matter of free contract.2 For breach of
these freely negotiated contracts, however, factory workers, journeymen,
and other wage workers were subject to penal sanctions, including imprisonment.The law declared that “journeymen, helpers, and factory workers,
who leave work without permission and without legal justiﬁcation, or
are guilty of shirking, or gross disobedience or insistent obstinacy, are to be
punished by a ﬁne of up to twenty thalers or imprisonment for up to fourteen days.”3 Penal sanctions for breach of contract by factory workers were
later eliminated by the Industrial Law of 1869.4
It is interesting that Prussia was far from being alone in nineteenthcentury Europe in imposing penal sanctions on wage workers for
breach of contract. In England, which possessed the most advanced
economy of this period, Parliament imposed even harsher penal sanctions
on English wage workers who could be imprisoned for up to three months
for quitting before the expiration of their contracts, for leaving work
without permission, or for disobedience.5 Between 1720 and 1843,
during the same period in which free markets replaced the traditional
economy, Parliament passed more than half a dozen statutes mandating
penal sanctions for labor-contract breaches.6 Between 1857 and 1875 about
1 Gesetzsammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten 1845, “Gewerbeordnung,” 41–78 (hereafter
PGS, 1845). Freedom of trade, however, was repealed four years later in 1849, and not reestablished
in Prussia until the Industrial Law of 1869, enacted by the North German Confederation.
2 PGS, 1845, “Gewerbeordnung,” §§ 134, 145.
3 PGS, 1845, “Gewerbeordnung,” § 184.
4 Bundesgesetzblatt des Norddeutschen Bundes, 1869, “Gewerbeordnung,” no. 26, 245–82, § 154.
5 See, e.g., 4 Geo. IV., c. 34, § III (1823). Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century it was common
for English wage workers to serve either under contracts for a term or under contracts terminable
only after some period of notice had been given. Employment at will was fairly unusual among
skilled workers of the period.
6 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London, 1956), 250–1n2.
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10,000 workers per year were proceeded against in England for violating
their labor agreements.7
In the twentieth century the criminal enforcement of labor contracts
has come to be viewed as rendering such labor “coerced” or “involuntary.”
During the nineteenth century, however, that was far from being the view
of many Europeans; from their standpoint free markets required reliable
contract enforcement. Without reliable contract enforcement large-scale
markets would not have been feasible.8 As one historian recently observed,
it was not until the eighteenth century, in Western Europe, England, and North
America, that societies ﬁrst appeared whose economic systems depended on the
expectation that most people, most of the time, were sufﬁciently conscience ridden
(and certain of retribution) that they could be trusted to keep their promises. . . .
Only to the extent that [the] norm [of promise keeping] prevails can economic
affairs be based on nothing more authoritative than the obligation arising out of
promises.
Both the growing force of the norm of promise keeping and its synchronization
with the spread of market relations are clearly inscribed in the history of the law
of contract. . . . For the ﬁrst time the law strained to make promisors generally
liable for whatever expectations their promises created. Never before had promises
counted for so much in human affairs, and never before had the penalties for being
short-willed and unreliable been so severe.9

Nineteenth-century European legal rules mandating penal sanctions for
breach of labor contracts must be seen as part of the process by which freer
markets were created. Large-scale free labor markets simply could not
function properly unless labor contracts could be reliably enforced. But
labor agreements, it was widely believed at the time, could not be reliably enforced against largely propertyless workers by means of monetary
damages.10 Penal sanctions represented, under the circumstances, nothing
more than a remedy for breach of contract in situations where monetary
damages could not be relied on. Such a remedy was thought to be an essential aspect of free contract in labor markets.
Not very much has been written explaining the abolition in 1869 of
penal sanctions for breach of contract by factory workers in Germany,
but in England the process has been described in detail. Organized labor
7 Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1857–1875, 19 vols. (London, 1858–76); see also Daphne Simon,
“Master and Servant,” in John Saville, ed., Democracy and the Labour Movement (London, 1954), 186n2.
8 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1990),
33–5.
9 Thomas Haskell, “Capitalism and the Humanitarian Sensibility, Part 2,” American Historical Review
90 (1985): 553–5.
10 See, e.g., James Edward Davis, The Master and Servant Act, 1867 (London, 1868), 7.
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mounted a long campaign beginning in the early 1860s to have penal sanctions repealed. In 1875 Parliament ﬁnally responded to the growing power
of labor by repealing the statutes. In England, labor prevailed in this campaign not only because of its growing electoral inﬂuence but also because
its reinterpretation of penal sanctions came to be widely accepted in English
culture, including English legal culture.11 From an ordinary contract remedy
entirely consistent with the liberal principle of free contract, penal sanctions began to be recharacterized as a remedy inconsistent with the liberal
principle of equal treatment under the law. (It was not equally available to
workers for employer contract breaches.)12 Over the ensuing twenty-ﬁve
years it came increasingly to be seen as a contract remedy that turned “contracts of service” into “contracts of slavery” and therefore became increasingly inconsistent with the long-standing liberal tradition that freedom of
contract should not extend to contracts of slavery.13
It seems clear that many nineteenth-century Europeans drew the distinction between “free” and “coerced” labor differently than we do, but that
that line began to be redrawn by the end of the nineteenth century.There
is a very basic reason why the line between “voluntary free” labor and
“involuntary coerced” labor has been drawn in different ways at different
times. Nearly all forms of labor not performed for sheer pleasure can be
characterized in either way. When we speak about most kinds of labor
compulsion, we are talking about situations in which the compelled party
is offered a choice between disagreeable alternatives and chooses the
lesser evil.
This type of compulsion is present, for example, in both slavery and
modern free wage labor. In slavery, labor normally is not elicited by directly
imparting motion to a slave’s limbs through overpowering physical force.
It is compelled by forcing slaves to choose among very unpleasant options,
for example, among death, dismemberment, torture, and endless conﬁnement, on the one hand, or backbreaking physical labor, on the other. The
labor of free wage workers is similarly elicited by offering workers a choice,
for example, between life on an inadequate welfare stipend, on the one
hand, or performing more or less unpleasant work for wages, on the other.
In the case of both the slave and the free worker, the parties may be said
to have been coerced into performing the labor or to have freely chosen
the lesser evil. Either characterization is applicable.This is why some choices
11 The Second Reform Act, which was passed in 1867, extended the suffrage to many town artisans.
12 Frederic Harrison,“Tracts for Trade Unionists” in Edmund Frow and Michael Katanka, eds., 1868,
Year of the Unions: A Documentary Survey (New York, 1968), 141–2.
13 L. J. Fry in De Francesco v. Barnum, 45 chap., d. 430 (1890), 438.
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among evils can be characterized as voluntary decisions, whereas other
choices among evils can simultaneously be characterized as coerced.Where
the line is drawn from a logical standpoint is arbitrary.
Needless to say, the choices presented in slavery are much harsher
than the choices normally presented in free wage labor. We may rightly
say, therefore, that the degree of coercion in one form is normally much
greater than it is in the other, but there are no legal grounds for saying that
the performance of labor in one case is coerced, whereas in the other
it is voluntary. As a matter of logic we have to say either that both are
involuntary to different degrees or that both involve the free choice of a
lesser evil.
The judgment about where to draw the line separating voluntary from
involuntary labor turns out not to be a judgment about where coercion
begins or ends in labor relations, but rather a judgment about what kinds
of hard choices we will allow some individuals to force other individuals
to make as the latter decide whether to enter or leave a labor relation, and
which kinds of hard choices we will not permit.
Judgments like these are equally involved in the modern deﬁnition of
free labor and are inscribed in modern contract and constitutional law.The
remedy of monetary damages for labor-contract breaches (which is permitted under modern law) will coerce workers into satisfying their labor
agreements under certain circumstances.“[A]ny legal liability for breach of
contract,” Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, “is a disagreeable consequence which tends to make the contractor do as he said he would.”14 “In
the case of a solvent person,” the legal realist Robert Hale noted, “the
motive for performing might often be the desire to escape pecuniary liability [for breach of contract]. If such desire is strong enough to make him
render the services stipulated in his contract, then the law does compel performance and enforce the labor.”15
It is only by ignoring the coercive effects of various pecuniary remedies
for breach of contract that the modern deﬁnition (and law) of free labor
is arrived at, in the same way that many nineteenth-century Europeans
ignored the coercive effects of penal sanctions for breach of contract
in their deﬁnition of free labor. The modern deﬁnition (and law) of free
labor also ignores a range of other, so-called “economic” pressures that
may compel workers to enter employment, to submit to discipline during
employment, and to remain in employment.
14 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), 246.
15 Robert L. Hale, Freedom Through Law: Public Control of Private Governing Power (New York, 1952),
191.
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John Stuart Mill, writing a decade after the English Poor Law implemented a policy of less eligibility in the reforms of 1832, noted that free
wage workers could be expected to enter employment only in situations
in which the main alternative to employment was kept more disagreeable
than employment itself.
If the condition of a person receiving [poor] relief is made as eligible as that of
the labourer who supports himself by his own exertions . . . [it] would require
as its supplement an organized system of compulsion, for governing and setting
[people] to work. . . . But if, consistently with guaranteeing all persons against
absolute want, the condition of those who are supported by legal charity can be
kept considerably less desirable than the condition of those who ﬁnd support for
themselves, none but beneﬁcial consequences can arise.16

As in Europe, the modern American constitutional deﬁnition of free
labor was only arrived at after a long struggle over the precise line that
should separate the types of hard choices that would “coerce” the labor of
workers who confronted them from the types of hard choices that left
workers “free” to choose labor as the lesser evil.
American fundamental law on the subject of coerced labor can be traced
back to the language of the Northwest Ordinance enacted by Congress in
1787. It declared that “There shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary servitude in the [Northwest] territory otherwise than in the punishment of
crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”17 The ordinance
applied to an area that encompasses the present-day states of Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. But the language of the ordinance
was later incorporated into the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which abolished slavery and involuntary servitude throughout the nation.
It is primarily to the interpretation of the term involuntary servitude, ﬁrst
in the ordinance and later in the Thirteenth Amendment, that we must turn
for an understanding of the changing deﬁnition of free labor in American fundamental law.As we examine these legal interpretations, however, we should
keep at least two things in mind. First, adult white indentured servants were
still being imported into the United States in 1787 and would continue to
be imported in signiﬁcant numbers until 1820, and in smaller numbers until
at least 1830. It seems likely that the framers of the Northwest Ordinance
would have considered these contractual arrangements to be voluntary rather
than involuntary servitude, which the ordinance prohibited.
16 Mill, Collected Works, III (Principles of Political Economy) (Toronto, 1965), 961.
17 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art.VI.
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Second, unlike the situation in England and Prussia, these imported
indentured servants were the only adult white workers subject at the time
to penal sanctions for labor-contract breaches. The reasons for this development are a bit of a mystery, but we do know that it is traceable to the
eighteenth century. Before 1700 statutes in a number of American colonies
subjected “hired” workers to penal sanctions for breaches of contract. But
over the course of that century these statutes began to disappear from the
colonial codes, leaving immigrant indentured servants the only white adult
contractual labor still subject to penal sanctions.
It was a struggle over the legality of indentured servitude under the provisions of the Northwest Ordinance that produced the ﬁrst judicial interpretations of involuntary servitude.The southern border of the Northwest
Territory was shared with areas in which slavery was entrenched and legal.
When settlers from these areas began to arrive in the Northwest Territory,
many brought slaves with them. Others believed it would be beneﬁcial
to the new territory to allow slaves to be imported. One expedient under
which slaves were held in parts of the territory was to have them sign
indentures committing them to twenty, forty, or more years of service,
either before they were brought into the territory or after they arrived.
When the question of the legality of black indentured servitude was
brought before the high courts of two of the states carved out of the territory, it produced two very different interpretations of precisely what practices were prohibited by the ban on involuntary servitude. In Phoebe v. Jay,
decided in 1828, the Illinois Supreme Court framed the issue in terms of
whether a laboring agreement had been entered into “voluntarily.”18 If it
had, then legal enforcement of the resulting agreement through speciﬁc
performance or penal sanctions did not transform the labor from voluntary to involuntary.The labor was “voluntary” because the worker had “voluntarily” agreed to perform it. All that was involved was the enforcement
of a contract entered into freely.19
Given the long history of indentured servitude in this country and the
common practice of penal sanctions to enforce labor contracts in Europe,
the Illinois court’s view of involuntary servitude was probably quite widely
shared at the time.The Illinois ruling did leave unresolved the question of
how harsh the terms of a “voluntary” labor agreement would have to be
before the agreement would be considered a contract of slavery and be
18 1 Ill. (Breese) 268 (1828).
19 Ibid. See also, the concurring opinion of Justice Thomas in Sarah, a woman of color v. Borders, 4 Scam.
341 (Ill., 1843), 347.
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rendered illegal by the absolute prohibition against slavery contained in the
ordinance. But under the Illinois ruling any state of servitude short of outright slavery apparently could be entered into in conformity with the ordinance, as long as it was done voluntarily.
The Illinois court did, however, have to face the question of precisely
what circumstances would render a decision to sign an indenture “involuntary” in the ﬁrst place. In Phoebe v. Jay a black woman had signed an
indenture to serve her master for forty years.20 The indenture had been
entered into pursuant to a statute that allowed slave masters to bring slaves
into the territory but required that they bring the slave before a clerk of
the court of common pleas within thirty days,“and in the presence of said
clerk, the said owner or possessor shall determine and agree, to and with
his or her negro or mulatto, upon the term of years which the said negro
or mulatto will and shall serve his or her said owner or possessor.”21 If a
black person refused to sign an indenture or to perform its terms, the master
was authorized under the statute to return the person to the state in which
he or she had been held as a slave.
The Illinois court entertained no doubt that the decision to sign an
indenture made by a black person confronted with this set of choices must
represent a coerced decision rather than the free choice of a lesser evil. “I
conceive that it would be an insult to common sense,” Justice Lockwood
wrote for the court, “to contend that the negro, under the circumstances
in which [s]he was placed, had any free agency.The only choice given [her]
was a choice of evils.”22 What other hard choices might coerce a person
into entering a labor relation involuntarily remained to be explored.
If in Illinois the speciﬁc enforcement of a forty-year labor agreement
did not render the labor involuntary so long as it had been entered into
voluntarily, such was not the case in Indiana. In 1821 the Indiana high court
set aside the indenture of a black woman who, the court reported, had
“voluntarily bound herself to serve . . . as an indented servant and housemaid for 20 years.”23 The court ruled that
while the [woman] remained in the service of the obligee without complaint, the
law presumes that her service was voluntarily performed; but her application to
the Circuit Court to be discharged from the custody of her master, establishes the
fact that she is willing to serve no longer; and, while this state of the will appears,
the law can not, by any possibility of intendment, presume that her service is
voluntary. . . . The fact then is, that the appellant is in a state of involuntary
20 1 Ill. (Breese) 268 (1828).
21 Ibid., 269.
22 Ibid., 270.
23 The Case of Mary Clark, a woman of color, 1 Blackf.122 (Ind. 1821), 123.
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servitude; and we are bound by the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, to
discharge her therefrom.24

Under the Indiana ruling, labor became involuntary servitude the
moment a person wanted to leave the relationship but was prevented from
doing so by a judicial decree of speciﬁc performance or by bodily seizure
by an employer. Here, the legal right to withdraw from the labor relationship at any time marked the boundary between free labor and involuntary
servitude. The use of the legal remedies of speciﬁc performance or penal
sanction to enforce even a voluntary labor agreement turned the labor into
involuntary servitude. The issue implicitly left unresolved by the Indiana
decision was whether a labor contract could be enforced through any legal
remedy at all consistent with the proscription of involuntary servitude.
More fundamentally, the Indiana ruling brought to the surface a fundamental problem within liberal commitments to freedom, which contained
a basic, unresolvable contradiction between commitments to liberty of
person and commitments to liberty of contract. Liberty of person under
the rule required that one’s contractual liberty be restricted, insofar as
one was no longer legally entitled to alienate one’s labor irrevocably by
contract.25
These opposing interpretive traditions persisted in American constitutional law throughout the nineteenth century.The United States Supreme
Court, surprisingly, did not make a deﬁnitive choice between them until
the twentieth century. This is not to say that both views enjoyed equal
popularity in the wider culture. It is fair to say that throughout the North,
labor practices and ideas conformed in the main to the view set forth
by the Indiana court.With the complete disappearance of white immigrant
indentured servitude in the 1830s the labor agreements of white adults
were not subject to speciﬁc performance or to penal sanctions anywhere
in the Northern states, with one signiﬁcant exception discussed subsequently. But there were only a few court opinions inscribing this view into
constitutional law. One was rendered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1856.
In Parsons v.Trask, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a
voluntary labor contract amounted to a species of servitude akin to slavery
when a worker was not free to leave before its expiration and if the nature
24 Ibid., 126.
25 On this contradiction, see Guyora Binder,“Substantive Liberty and the Legacy of the Fuller Court,”
unpublished manuscript in author’s possession, § VI. (30.); and Frank H. Knight, Freedom & Reform:
Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy (New York, 1947; reprint, 1982), 78–9.
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of the services and the place where they were to be performed were left
to be determined unilaterally by the employer.26
Even the Civil War did not lay the interpretive question deﬁnitively to
rest.The Thirteenth Amendment incorporated the language of the Northwest Ordinance but did not provide clariﬁcation. In 1867 Congress adopted
the Indiana and Massachusetts interpretation of the term involuntary servitude in the Anti-Peonage Act it passed that year pursuant to the Thirteenth
Amendment. The peonage statute that Congress enacted in 1867 reached
a labor relationship that was often entered into voluntarily. But the statute
had been drafted poorly and its language was ambiguous. More fundamentally, the interpretive question had not been deﬁnitively resolved.
The U.S. Army and, in certain cases, agents of the Freedmen’s Bureau, for
example, could still believe that they were introducing a free labor system
into the South after the war even as they went about speciﬁcally enforcing the labor contracts of former slaves who came under their jurisdiction.
The U.S. Supreme Court did not directly confront the issue until 1897,
when a majority of the court adopted not the Indiana and Massachusetts
interpretations of “involuntary servitude” as we might have expected but
rather the Illinois reading. However, the Indiana view, which was to
triumph in the twentieth century, survived in Justice Harlan’s dissent. The
case of Robertson v. Baldwin arose when several merchant mariners were
arrested for deserting their ship in Oregon in breach of the contracts they
had signed agreeing to perform the duties of seamen during the entire
voyage. The men were arrested and held until the ship was ready to sail,
and then they were placed on board against their wills. They refused to
perform their duties, and when the ship returned to San Francisco they
were arrested and charged with refusing to work in violation of a federal
statute governing merchant seamen. They sued based on a writ of habeas
corpus, asking that they be freed from their conﬁnement, and argued that
the federal statute under which they were being held violated the involuntary servitude provision of the Thirteenth Amendment.27
The court upheld the validity of the statute on two grounds. The ﬁrst,
broader ground is the more interesting one. The validity of this statute,
Justice Brown wrote for the court,
depends upon the construction to be given to the term “involuntary servitude.”
Does the epithet “involuntary” attach to the word “servitude” continuously, and make illegal
26 Parsons v.Trask, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 473 (1856), 478.
27 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275 (1897), 280–1.
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any service which becomes involuntary at any time during its existence; or does it attach only
at the inception of the servitude, and characterize it as unlawful because unlawfully entered
into? If the former be the true construction, then, no one, not even a soldier, sailor
or apprentice, can surrender his liberty, even for a day; and the soldier may desert
his regiment upon the eve of battle, or the sailor abandon his ship at any intermediate port or landing, or even in a storm at sea. . . . If the latter, then an individual
may, for a valuable consideration, contract for the surrender of his personal liberty for a deﬁnite time and for a recognized purpose, and subordinate his going and coming to the will of
another during the continuance of the contract; – not that all such contracts would be lawful,
but that a servitude which was knowingly and willingly entered into could not be termed
involuntary. Thus, if one should agree, for a yearly wage, to serve another in a particular capacity during his life, and never to leave his estate without his consent,
the contract might not be enforceable for the want of a legal remedy, or might be
void upon grounds of public policy, but the servitude could not be properly termed
involuntary. Such agreements for a limited personal servitude at one time were very
common in England [citing the 1823 English statute]. . . . The breach of a contract for personal service has not, however, been recognized in this country as
involving a liability to criminal punishment, except in the case of soldiers, sailors
and possibly some others, nor would public opinion tolerate a statute to that effect.28

The majority correctly saw that criminal punishment for labor-contract
breaches was not nearly so anomalous as many people in the United States
thought. It used English practice of the period as a way of vindicating its
choice of freedom of contract over freedom of person, its resolution of that
irresolvable dilemma within liberalism itself.The court’s second ground was
based on the opinion that “the [Thirteenth] amendment was not intended
to introduce any novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of
service which have always been treated as exceptional,” merchant mariners
constituting one of these exceptions.29 In a blistering dissent, Justice Harlan
offered this reply to the court’s opinion: “The condition of one who contracts to render personal services in connection with the private business
of another becomes a condition of involuntary servitude from the moment
he is compelled against his will to continue in such service. . . . [T]o require
him, against his will, to continue in the personal service of his master is to
place him and keep him in a condition of involuntary servitude.”30 Harlan
opined that
If congress under its power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several states, can authorize the arrest of seamen who engaged to serve upon
a private vessel, and compel him by force to return to the vessel and remain during
the term for which he engaged, a similar rule may be prescribed as to employés
28 Emphasis added. Ibid.
30 Emphasis added. Ibid., 301.

29 Ibid., 282.
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upon railroads and steamboats engaged in commerce among the states. . . . Again,
as the legislatures of the States have all legislative power not prohibited to them
. . . why may not the States, under the principles this day announced, compel all
employés of railroads engaged in domestic commerce, and all domestic servants,
and all employés in private establishments, within their respective limits, to remain
with their employers during the terms for which they were severally engaged,
under penalty of being arrested by some sheriff or constable, and forcibly returned
to the service of their employers?31

Harlan, a Southerner himself, may well have realized that the majority’s
opinion could open the ﬂoodgates to this kind of legislation in the South.
Immediately following the Civil War a number of Southern states had
attempted to enact black codes that contained provisions, among others,
for the criminal punishment of labor contract breaches. These were characterized in the North as attempts to reimpose slavery, and most of the
codes were repealed or withdrawn, though some of these early laws survived.32 With one eye on possible Northern reaction, in the 1880s Southerners began to fashion a new set of laws calling for criminal punishment,
now, in most cases, not directly for breach of labor contracts but for acceptance of advances followed by failure to work out one’s time. These socalled false pretense statutes proliferated in the 1880s and 1890s and were
mainly used to compel black farm workers to perform their labor agreements. In agriculture, a reliable labor force was especially important. Entire
crops might be lost if workers were not available at crucial times in the
growing season. To ensure a reliable labor force, Southern landowners in
this period typically signed black farm workers to year-long contracts. On
signing, a landowner would advance a sum of money to a worker as a loan
repayable by deductions from wages during the term. Under these false
pretense statutes, if a worker left before completing the contract term and
while still in debt to the landowner, he could be criminally prosecuted for
committing a species of fraud and ﬁned or imprisoned. Technically these
prosecutions were for fraud and not for breach of a labor agreement, but
in reality the statutes made it possible for landowners criminally to enforce
the labor agreements of their black agricultural workers.
Under the logic of Robertson v. Baldwin, however, such subtlety would
not be necessary. Southerners could feel free to attack the problem of labor
contract enforcement directly.33 Indeed, the majority’s opinion echoed an
31 Ibid., 302–3.
32 William Cohen, At Freedom’s Edge: Black Mobility and the Southern White Quest for Racial Control,
1861–1915 (Baton Rouge, La., 1991), 28–37.
33 A number of Southern legislatures enacted these statutes as false pretense statutes in order to circumvent state constitutional restrictions on imprisonment for debt.
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opinion delivered by the South Carolina Supreme Court not too many
years earlier in State v. Williams, ruling that a South Carolina statute that
provided directly for the criminal punishment of labor contract breaches
did not violate the constitution’s prohibition of involuntary servitude.
If the general assembly sees proper to make the violation of a particular species of
civil contracts a criminal offence, we are unable to discover in the provisions of
the constitution anything which forbids such legislation. No person is required to
enter into such a contract unless he chooses to do so; and if he does so, he must
take the consequences afﬁxed by the law to the violation of a contract into which
he has voluntarily entered. . . . We are unable to discover any feature of “involuntary servitude” in the matter. Everyone who undertakes to serve another in any
capacity parts for a time with that absolute liberty which it is claimed that the
constitution secures to all; but as he does this voluntarily, it cannot be properly said
that he is deprived of any of his constitutional rights; and if he violates his undertaking he thereby of his own accord subjects himself to such punishment as the
law making power may have seen ﬁt to impose for such violation.34

The opinions in Robertson v. Baldwin and State v.Williams make apparent
that the interpretive tradition developed in Illinois in the 1820s still possessed great vitality at the close of the nineteenth century, long after the
Civil War. At the time Robertson v. Baldwin was decided in 1897 there were,
in effect, two systems of contract law covering labor agreements in this
country: The Southern one bore rough similarities to the contract system
in effect in Prussia and England not too many years before.The Northern
one, in which neither speciﬁc performance nor penal sanctions were available for labor contract breaches, had a long history and was supported by
its own constitutional tradition that harkened back to a decision of the
Indiana high court. Under these two constitutional traditions, both systems
could make plausible arguments that they were free labor systems based on
free contract.
The truth seems to have been that the majority in Robertson v. Baldwin
did not believe their decision applied beyond the situation of merchant
mariners. This is interesting in and of itself, given that Robertson v. Baldwin
was brought before the Supreme Court as a test case mounted by the
seamen’s union.35 The decision produced a strong reaction among organized seamen. As the San Francisco Examiner put it: “According to the
highest tribunal which can pass on the matter, the difference between a
deep-water sailor and a slave is $15 per month.”36 Union leaders immedi34 State v.Williams, 32 S.C. 123 (1889), 126.
35 Hyman Weintraub, Andrew Furuseth, Emancipator of the Seamen (Berkeley, Calif., 1959), 35.
36 Quoted in ibid.
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ately launched a campaign in Congress to have the federal statute amended.
Under intense pressure from the seamen’s union, Congress did give the
seamen half of what they had been lobbying for, amending the statute, but
only eliminating criminal penalties for desertion in American ports; it
retained criminal penalties for desertion in foreign ports.37 The seamen’s
union continued to lobby Congress on and off for another decade before
ultimately achieving its goal of having penal sanctions for breach of contract abolished. It was not until 1915 with the LaFollette Seamen’s Act that
Congress ﬁnally eliminated criminal penalties for desertion from private
vessels.38 By this time the seamen’s victory was primarily symbolic,
however, for shipowners had long since ceased to use penal sanctions to
enforce the contracts of their sailors.
The seamen’s union had continued to pursue its goal of eliminating
penal sanctions for breach of contract even after the Supreme Court had
begun to hand down its ﬁrst peonage decisions. In Clyatt v. United States
(1905), decided only eight years after Robertson, the court ﬁnally made a
deﬁnitive choice between constitutional traditions, adopting the Indiana
interpretation of the term “involuntary servitude.” Justice David J. Brewer
writing for the court, declared
Peonage is sometimes classiﬁed as voluntary or involuntary, but this implies simply
a difference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the servitude.The
one exists where the debtor voluntarily contracts to enter the service of his creditor. The other is forced upon the debtor by some provision of law. But peonage,
however created, is compulsory service, involuntary servitude. . . . A clear distinction exists between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt. In the latter case the debtor, though
contracting to pay his indebtedness by labor or service, and subject like any other
contractor to an action for damages for the breach of contract, can elect at any
time to break it, and no law or force compels performance or a continuance of
the service.39

Although it implicitly rejected the view of the Robertson majority, the
Clyatt court did not explicitly overrule Robertson. Rather, it limited the
earlier case to its facts, characterizing the second ground for the decision
as the rule of the case, and then it simply brushed the case aside.“We need
not stop to consider,” Brewer wrote, “any possible limits or exceptional
cases, such as the service of a sailor [citing Robertson v. Baldwin].”40 In Bailey
v. Alabama, decided in 1911, the Supreme Court struck down Alabama’s
37 Ibid., 43.
38 Ibid., 120–1, 134.
39 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), 215.
40 Ibid., 216.
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false pretenses statute as a violation of the Anti-Peonage Act and the
Thirteenth Amendment. Justice Charles E. Hughes, building on the Clyatt
opinion, declared that the Anti-Peonage Act “necessarily embraces all legislation which seeks to compel the service or labor by making it a crime
to refuse or fail to perform it.”41
Evidently, Northern elites were of two minds on the question of penal
sanctions for breaches of labor contracts.When it came to their use against
helpless black people in the South, with its history of slavery but also with
its distance from Northern labor relations, Northern elites felt inclined to
invoke the Indiana tradition that had, after all, ﬁrst been developed in a
similar context.The peonage cases that found their way before the Supreme
Court had been initiated by federal authorities and did not grow out of an
indigenous movement of black workers. The people responsible for the
attack on Southern peonage were Progressives, committed to protecting
the weak by reforming government and the legal system.
However, when the question of penal sanctions was posed outside the
context of Southern labor relations as an abstract matter of contract law,
or in the Northern context where many white workers were organized,
possessed suffrage, and where what penal sanctions there were applied only
to a tiny portion of the working population, the question seems to have
presented greater difﬁculties for the elites. Not only do we have the decision in Robertson to point to, but during the ﬁrst decade of the twentieth
century the legislatures of three Northern states made their sympathy with
Robertson clear when they enacted false pretenses labor contract statutes of
their own.These statutes aimed at enforcing the labor agreements of white
workers who had received transportation advances to remote lumbering,
mining, or railroad construction sites. Minnesota enacted such a statute in
1901,42 followed by Michigan in 1903,43 and Maine in 1907.44 We do know
that the Maine statute was enforced. Fifty or sixty cases were brought before
one rural justice of the peace after 1907.45
In his dissent in Bailey, Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested that the majority’s opinion had been improperly swayed by the particular social context
in which the case had arisen. “We all agree that this case is to be considered and decided in the same way as if it arose in Idaho or New
York. Neither public document nor evidence discloses a law which by its
41
42
43
44
45

Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), 243.
General Laws of Minnesota for 1901, chap. 165, pp. 212–13.
Michigan Compiled Laws, §§ 408.582–408.583.
The Revised Statutes of Maine (1917), chap. 128, § 12.
John Clifton Elder, “Peonage in Maine,” A Manuscript Report sent to the Attorney General of
U.S., National Archives, Record Group #60 Dept. of Justice ﬁle #50-34-0, p. 13.
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administration is made something different from what it appears on its face,
and therefore the fact that in Alabama it mainly concerns the blacks does
not matter.”46 He went on to explain how deeply problematic the majority’s opinion was. “The Thirteenth Amendment,” Holmes wrote,
does not outlaw contracts for labor. That would be at least as great a misfortune
for the laborer as for the man that employed him. For it certainly would affect the
terms of the bargain unfavorably for the laboring man if it were understood that
the employer could do nothing in case the laborer saw ﬁt to break his word. But
any legal liability for breach of contract is a disagreeable consequence which tends
to make the contractor do as he said he would. Liability to an action for damages
has that tendency as well as a ﬁne. If the mere imposition of such consequences
as tend to make a man keep to his promise is the creation of peonage when the
contract happens to be for labor, I do not see why the allowance of a civil action
is not, as well as an indictment ending in a ﬁne. . . . I do not blink the fact that
the liability to imprisonment may work as a motive when a ﬁne without it would
not, and that it may induce the laborer to keep on when he would like to leave.
But it does not strike me as an objection to a law that it is effective. If the contract is one that ought not to be made, prohibit it. But if it is a perfectly fair and
proper contract, I can see no reason why the State should not throw its weight on
the side of performance.47

Holmes was right, of course, that all contract remedies operate to enforce
agreements by presenting the breaching party with a choice between performing and a disagreeable alternative. To the extent that a party decides
to perform labor in order to avoid the unpleasant alternative, that party
may be said to have chosen the lesser evil voluntarily, or to have chosen it
under coercion. Either characterization is available, but once we decide to
characterize such a choice as coerced, as the majority in Bailey did with
respect to criminal penalties, then there is no logical ground for saying that
any similar choice is “voluntary.” We must conclude that labor contracts
cannot be enforced through any legal remedy at all consistent with the prohibition against involuntary servitude.
Although Holmes was correct about all this, it did not seem to have bothered the majority in either Clyatt or Bailey, both of whom blithely ignored
the coercive effects of money damages for contract breaches, presenting
them, in fact, as the opposite of “compelled” performance.“A clear distinction exists,” Justice Brewer wrote in Clyatt,“between peonage and the voluntary performance of labor or rendering of services in payment of a debt.
In the latter case the debtor, though contracting to pay his indebtedness by
labor or service, and subject like any other contractor to an action for damages
46 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1910), 245–6.
47 Ibid., 246–7.
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for breach of that contract, can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels
performance or a continuance of the service.”48
It is also true, as Holmes recognized, that certain alternatives to performance are less unpleasant than others, and fewer people will tend to choose
performance when confronted with them. But the performance of those
who choose to avoid these unpleasant alternatives by rendering the labor
service is no more voluntary than the labor service of those who choose
to perform to avoid the unpleasant alternative of prison. The decision of
the majority is, from a logical standpoint, arbitrary, a decision to draw a line
through a continuum and to call certain decisions to perform labor under
certain kinds of threats “voluntary” and other decisions to perform labor
under other kinds of threats “involuntary.” In fact, the decision as to where
to draw such a line is not a decision about where coercion begins or ends
in labor relations, but rather a normative and political decision about what
kinds of hard choices we should continue to allow certain people to force
others to make and what kinds we should not permit.
There is no natural or logical point in this process. The peonage cases
place criminal penalties for breaches of labor contracts on one side of the
line and ordinary money damages on the other, without any explanation
or justiﬁcation for this particular position.
In the peonage cases, the Supreme Court created the modern constitutional standard for free labor by rejecting an earlier constitutional tradition
that had deﬁned free labor differently.This decision was forced on the court
by the perceived need to combat Southern efforts to reimpose a form of
servitude on black people.And it is to this moral and political decision that
we must trace the constitutional origins of modern free labor in this
country, just as we must trace the origins of modern free labor in England
to a political and moral victory of the laboring classes.
Modern free labor did not arise as the result of the spread of liberal ideas
or the diffusion of free markets based on free contract. It was the result of
a difﬁcult political and moral resolution of fundamental dilemmas within
liberalism itself. Liberalism demanded that market transactions be voluntary, not coerced. But liberal ideas provided no objective, value-neutral
means for distinguishing coerced from voluntary decisions. Only changing
political, constitutional, and moral circumstances in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century produced the modern deﬁnition of coerced labor that
included within that deﬁnition voluntary contractual labor enforced
through speciﬁc performance or penal sanctions. Once an arbitrary line
48 Emphasis added. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905), 215–16.
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had been drawn through a continuum of contract remedies, it became possible to identify coerced contractual labor with contractual slavery. This
expansion of the deﬁnition of contract of slavery made more justiﬁable a
restriction on the freedom to contract into such relationships.
Most nineteenth-century liberals had long since resolved the conﬂict
between freedom of contract and freedom of person in favor of freedom
of person when it came to contracts of slavery. Most took the position that
individuals should not be free to alienate their freedom. Once contractual
labor enforced through penal sanctions came to be redeﬁned as a form of
slavery, the same resolution of this basic liberal dilemma could be adopted
in the case of such contracts. Modern free labor is not the result of a regime
of perfect freedom of contract, but is the product of restraints placed on
freedom of contract in the interest of preserving liberty of person.49 It represents a particular resolution of fundamental dilemmas within liberalism
itself. Other resolutions of these basic problems were possible, leading to
regimes of free contract like those in place in England, Prussia, and Illinois
during the ﬁrst two-thirds of the nineteenth century. It was only a set of
contingent political events and changing moral standards that produced
the modern version of free labor during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.50
49 See Binder, “Substantive Liberty,” and Knight, Freedom & Reform.
50 Ibid.

